Letters from The Federal Farmer to The Republican
(Richard Henry Lee ?)

XVII.

January 23, 1788.

Dear sir,

I believe the people of the United States are full in the opinion, that
a free and mild government can be preserved in their extensive territories,
only under the substantial forms of a federal republic. As several of the
ablest advocates for the system proposed, have acknowledged this (and I hope
the confessions they have published will be preserved and remembered) I shall
not take up time to establish this point. A question then arises, how far that
system partakes of a federal republic.—I observed in a former letter,
that it appears to be the first important step to a consolidation of the
states; that its strong tendency is to that point.

But what do we mean by a federal republic? and what by a consolidated
government? To erect a federal republic, we must first make a number of states
on republican principles; each state with a government organized for the
internal management of its affairs: The states, as such, must unite under a
federal head, and delegate to it powers to make and execute laws in certain
enumerated cases, under certain restrictions; this head may be a single
assembly, like the present congress, or the Amphictionic council; or it may
consist of a legislature, with one or more branches; of an executive, and of a
judiciary. To form a consolidated, or one entire government, there must be no
state, or local governments, but all things, persons and property, must be
subject to the laws of one legislature alone; to one executive, and one
judiciary. Each state government, as the government of New Jersey, &c. is a
consolidated, or one entire government, as it respects the counties, towns,
citizens and property within the limits of the state.—The state
governments are the basis, the pillar on which the federal head is placed, and
the whole together, when formed on elective principles, constitute a federal
republic. A federal republic in itself supposes state or local governments to
exist, as the body or props, on which the federal head rests, and that it
cannot remain a moment after they cease. In erecting the federal government,
and always in its councils, each state must be known as a sovereign body; but
in erecting this government, I conceive, the legislature of the state, by the
expressed or implied assent of the people, or the people of the state, under
the direction of the government of it, may accede to the federal compact: Nor
do I conceive it to be necessarily a part of a confederacy of states, that each
have an equal voice in the general councils. A confederated republic being
organized, each state must retain powers for managing its internal police, and
all delegate to the union power to manage general concerns: The quantity of
power the union must possess is one thing, the mode of exercising the powers
given, is quite a different consideration; and it is the mode of exercising
them, that makes one of the essential distinctions between one entire or
consolidated government, and a federal republic; that is, however the
government may be organized, if the laws of the union, in most important
concerns, as in levying and collecting taxes, raising troops, &c. operate
immediately upon the persons and property of individuals, and not on states,
extend to organizing the militia, &c. the government, as to its
administration, as to making and executing laws, is not federal, but
consolidated. To illustrate my idea—the union makes a requisition, and
assigns to each state its quota of men or monies wanted; each state, by its own
laws and officers, in its own way, furnishes its quota: here the state
governments stand between the union and individuals; the laws of the union
operate only on states, as such, and federally: Here nothing can be done
without the meetings of the state legislatures—but in the other case the
union, though the state legislatures should not meet for years together,
proceeds immediately, by its own laws and officers, to levy and collect monies
of individuals, to inlist men, form armies, &c. here the laws of the union
operate immediately on the body of the people, on persons and property; in the
same manner the laws of one entire consolidated government operate.—These two modes are very distinct, and in their operation and consequences have
directly opposite tendencies: The first makes the existence of the state
governments indispensable, and throws all the detail business of levying and
collecting the taxes, &c. into the hands of those governments, and into the
hands, of course, of many thousand officers solely created by, and dependent on
the state. The last entirely excludes the agency of the respective states, and
throws the whole business of levying and collecting taxes, &c. into the
hands of many thousand officers solely created by, and dependent upon the
union, and makes the existence of the state government of no consequence in the
case. It is true, congress in raising any given sum in direct taxes, must by
the constitution, raise so much of it in one state, and so much in another, by
a fixed rule, which most of the states some time since agreed to: But this does
not effect the principle in question, it only secures each state against any
arbitrary proportions. The federal mode is perfectly safe and eligible, founded
in the true spirit of a confederated republic there could be no possible
exception to it, did we not find by experience, that the states will sometimes
neglect to comply with the reasonable requisitions of the union. It being
according to the fundamental principles of federal republics, to raise men and
monies by requisitions, and for the states individually to organize and train
the militia, I conceive, there can be no reason whatever for departing from
them, except this, that the states sometimes neglect to comply with reasonable
requisitions, and that it is dangerous to attempt to compel a delinquent state
by force, as it may often produce a war. We ought, therefore, to enquire
attentively, how extensive the evils to be guarded against are, and cautiously
limit the remedies to the extent of the evils. I am not about to defend the
confederation, or to charge the proposed constitution with imperfections not in
it; but we ought to examine facts, and strip them of the false colourings often
given them by incautious observations, by unthinking or designing men. We ought
to premise, that laws for raising men and monies, even in consolidated
governments, are not often punctually complied with. Historians, except in
extraordinary cases, but very seldom take notice of the detail collection of
taxes; but these facts we have fully proved, and well attested; that the most
energetic governments have relinquished taxes frequently, which were of many
years standing. These facts amply prove, that taxes assessed, have remained
many years uncollected. I agree there have been instances in the republics of
Greece, Holland, &c. in the course of several centuries, of states
neglecting to pay their quotas of requisitions; but it is a circumstance
certainly deserving of attention, whether these nations which have depended on
requisitions principally for their defence, have not raised men and monies
nearly as punctually as entire governments, which have taxed directly; whether
we have not found the latter as often distressed for the want of troops and
monies, as the former. It has been said, that the Amphictionic council, and the
Germanic head, have not possessed sufficient powers to controul the members of
the republic in a proper manner. Is this, if true, to be imputed to
requisitions? Is it not principally to be imputed to the unequal powers of
those members, connected with this important circumstance, that each member
possessed power to league itself with foreign powers, and powerful neighbours,
without the consent of the head. After all, has not the Germanic body a
government as good as its neighbours in general? and did not the Grecian
republic remain united several centuries, and form the theatre of human
greatness? No government in Europe has commanded monies more plentifully than
the government of Holland. As to the United States, the separate states lay
taxes directly, and the union calls for taxes by way of requisitions; and is it
a fact, that more monies are due in proportion on requisitions in the United
States, than on the state taxes directly laid?—It is but about ten years
since congress begun to make requisitions, and in that time, the monies,
&c. required, and the bounties given for men required of the states, have
amounted, specie value, to about 36 millions dollars, about 24 millions of
dollars of which have been actually paid; and a very considerable part of the
12 millions not paid, remains so not so much from the neglect of the states, as
from the sudden changes in paper money, &c. which in a great measure
rendered payments of no service, and which often induced the union indirectly
to relinquish one demand, by making another in a different form. Before we
totally condemn requisitions, we ought to consider what immense bounties the
states gave, and what prodigious exertions they made in the war, in order to
comply with the requisitions of congress; and if since the peace they have been
delinquent, ought we not carefully to enquire, whether that delinquency is to
be imputed solely to the nature of requisitions? ought it not in part to be
imputed to two other causes? I mean first, an opinion, that has extensively
prevailed, that the requisitions for domestic interest have not been founded on
just principles; and secondly, the circumstance, that the government itself, by
proposing imposts, &c. has departed virtually from the constitutional
system; which proposed changes, like all changes proposed in government,
produce an inattention and negligence in the execution of the government in
being.

I am not for depending wholly on requisitions; but I mention these few
facts to shew they are not so totally futile as many pretend. For the truth of
many of these facts I appeal to the public records; and for the truth of the
others, I appeal to many republican characters, who are best informed in the
affairs of the United States. Since the peace, and till the convention
reported, the wisest men in the United States generally supposed, that certain
limited funds would answer the purposes of the union: and though the states are
by no means in so good a condition as I wish they were, yet, I think, I may
very safely affirm, they are in a better condition than they would be had
congress always possessed the powers of taxation now contended for. The fact is
admitted, that our federal government does not possess sufficient powers to
give life and vigor to the political system; and that we experience
disappointments, and several inconveniencies; but we ought carefully to
distinguish those which are merely the consequences of a severe and tedious
war, from those which arise from defects in the federal system. There has been
an entire revolution in the United States within thirteen years, and the least
we can compute the waste of labour and property at, during that period, by the
war, is three hundred million of dollars. Our people are like a man just
recovering from a severe fit of sickness. It was the war that disturbed the
course of commerce, introduced floods of paper money, the stagnation of credit,
and threw many valuable men out of steady business. From these sources our
greatest evils arise; men of knowledge and reflection must perceive it;—but then, have we not done more in three or four years past, in repairing the
injuries of the war, by repairing houses and estates, restoring industry,
frugality, the fisheries, manufactures, &c. and thereby laying the
foundation of good government, and of individual and political happiness, than
any people ever did in a like time; we must judge from a view of the country
and facts, and not from foreign newspapers, or our own, which are printed
chiefly in the commercial towns, where imprudent living, imprudent
importations, and many unexpected disappointments, have produced a despondency,
and a disposition to view every thing on the dark side. Some of the evils we
feel, all will agree, ought to be imputed to the defective administration of
the governments. From these and various considerations, I am very clearly of
opinion, that the evils we sustain, merely on account of the defects of the
confederation, are but as a feather in the balance against a mountain, compared
with those which would, infallibly, be the result of the loss of general
liberty, and that happiness men enjoy under a frugal, free, and mild
government.

Heretofore we do not seem to have seen danger any where, but in giving
power to congress, and now no where but in congress wanting powers; and,
without examining the extent of the evils to be remedied, by one step, we are
for giving up to congress almost all powers of any importance without
limitation. The defects of the confederation are extravagantly magnified, and
every species of pain we feel imputed to them: and hence it is inferred, there
must be a total change of the principles, as well as forms of government: and
in the main point, touching the federal powers, we rest all on a logical
inference, totally inconsistent with experience and sound political
reasoning.

It is said, that as the federal head must make peace and war, and
provide for the common defence, it ought to possess all powers necessary to
that end: that powers unlimited, as to the purse and sword, to raise men and
monies, and form the militia, are necessary to that end; and, therefore, the
federal head ought to possess them. This reasoning is far more specious than
solid: it is necessary that these powers so exist in the body politic, as to be
called into exercise whenever necessary for the public safety; but it is by no
means true, that the man, or congress of men, whose duty it more immediately is
to provide for the common defence, ought to possess them without limitation.
But clear it is, that if such men, or congress, be not in a situation to hold
them without danger to liberty, he or they ought not to possess them. It has
long been thought to be a well founded position, that the purse and sword ought
not to be placed in the same hands in a free government. Our wise ancestors
have carefully separated them—placed the sword in the hands of their
king, even under considerable limitations, and the purse in the hands of the
commons alone: yet the king makes peace and war, and it is his duty to provide
for the common defence of the nation. This authority at least goes thus far—that a nation, well versed in the science of government, does not
conceive it to be necessary or expedient for the man entrusted with the common
defence and general tranquility, to possess unlimitedly the powers in question,
or even in any considerable degree. Could he, whose duty it is to defend the
public, possess in himself independently, all the means of doing it consistent
with the public good, it might be convenient: but the people of England know
that their liberties and happiness would be in infinitely greater danger from
the king’s unlimited possession of these powers, than from all external enemies
and internal commotions to which they might be exposed: therefore, though they
have made it his duty to guard the empire, yet they have wisely placed in other
hands, the hands of their representatives, the power to deal out and controul
the means. In Holland their high mightinesses must provide for the common
defence, but for the means they depend, in a considerable degree, upon
requisitions made on the state or local assemblies. Reason and facts evince,
that however convenient it might be for an executive magistrate, or federal
head, more immediately charged with the national defence and safety, solely,
directly, and independently to possess all the means; yet such magistrate, or
head, never ought to possess them, if thereby the public liberties shall be
endangered. The powers in question never have been, by nations wise and free,
deposited, nor can they ever be, with safety, any where, but in the principal
members of the national system:—where these form one entire government,
as in Great-Britain, they are separated and lodged in the principal members of
it. But in a federal republic, there is quite a different organization; the
people form this kind of government, generally, because their territories are
too extensive to admit of their assembling in one legislature, or of executing
the laws on free principles under one entire government. They convene in their
local assemblies, for local purposes, and for managing their internal concerns,
and unite their states under a federal head for general purposes. It is the
essential characteristic of a confederated republic, that this head be
dependant on, and kept within limited bounds by, the local governments; and it
is because, in these alone, in fact, the people can be substantially assembled
or represented. It is, therefore, we very universally see, in this kind of
government, the congressional powers placed in a few hands, and accordingly
limited, and specifically enumerated: and the local assemblies strong and well
guarded, and composed of numerous members. Wise men will always place the
controuling power where the people are substantially collected by their
representatives. By the proposed system, the federal head will possess, without
limitation, almost every species of power that can, in its exercise, tend to
change the government, or to endanger liberty; while in it, I think it has been
fully shewn, the people will have but the shadow of representation, and but the
shadow of security for their rights and liberties. In a confederated republic,
the division of representation, &c. in its nature, requires a correspondent
division and deposit of powers, relative to taxes and military concerns: and I
think the plan offered stands quite alone, in confounding the principles of
governments in themselves totally distinct. I wish not to exculpate the states
for their improper neglects in not paying their quotas of requisitions; but, in
applying the remedy, we must be governed by reason and facts. It will not be
denied, that the people have a right to change the government when the majority
chuse it, if not restrained by some existing compact—that they have a
right to displace their rulers, and consequently to determine when their
measures are reasonable or not—and that they have a right, at any time,
to put a stop to those measures they may deem prejudicial to them, by such
forms and negatives as they may see fit to provide. From all these, and many
other well founded considerations, I need not mention, a question arises, what
powers shall there be delegated to the federal head, to insure safety, as well
as energy, in the government? I think there is a safe and proper medium pointed
out by experience, by reason, and facts. When we have organized the government,
we ought to give power to the union, so far only as experience and present
circumstances shall direct, with a reasonable regard to time to come. Should
future circumstances, contrary to our expectations, require that further powers
be transferred to the union, we can do it far more easily, than get back those
we may now imprudently give. The system proposed is untried: candid advocates
and opposers admit, that it is, in a degree, a mere experiment, and that its
organization is weak and imperfect; surely then, the safe ground is cautiously
to vest power in it, and when we are sure we have given enough for ordinary
exigencies, to be extremely careful how we delegate powers, which, in common
cases, must necessarily be useless or abused, and of very uncertain effect in
uncommon ones.

By giving the union power to regulate commerce, and to levy and collect
taxes by imposts, we give it an extensive authority, and permanent productive
funds, I believe quite as adequate to the present demands of the union, as
excises and direct taxes can be made to the present demands of the separate
states. The state governments are now about four times as expensive as that of
the union; and their several state debts added together, are nearly as large as
that of the union—Our impost duties since the peace have been almost as
productive as the other sources of taxation, and when under one general system
of regulations, the probability is, that those duties will be very considerably
increased: Indeed the representation proposed will hardly justify giving to
congress unlimited powers to raise taxes by imposts, in addition to the other
powers the union must necessarily have. It is said, that if congress possess
only authority to raise taxes by imposts, trade probably will be overburdened
with taxes, and the taxes of the union be found inadequate to any uncommon
exigencies: To this we may observe, that trade generally finds its own level,
and will naturally and necessarily heave off any undue burdens laid upon it:
further, if congress alone possess the impost, and also unlimited power to
raise monies by excises and direct taxes, there must be much more danger that
two taxing powers, the union and states, will carry excises and direct taxes to
an unreasonable extent, especially as these have not the natural boundaries
taxes on trade have. However, it is not my object to propose to exclude
congress from raising monies by internal taxes, as by duties, excises, and
direct taxes; but my opinion is, that congress, especially in its proposed
organization, ought not to raise monies by internal taxes, except in strict
conformity to the federal plan; that is, by the agency of the state governments
in all cases, except where a state shall neglect, for an unreasonable time, to
pay its quota of a requisition; and never where so many of the state
legislatures as represent a majority of the people, shall formally determine an
excise law or requisition is improper, in their next session after the same be
laid before them. We ought always to recollect that the evil to be guarded
against is found by our own experience, and the experience of others, to be
mere neglect in the states to pay their quotas; and power in the union to levy
and collect the neglecting states’ quotas with interest, is fully adequate to
the evil. By this federal plan, with this exception mentioned, we secure the
means of collecting the taxes by the usual process of law, and avoid the evil
of attempting to compel or coerce a state; and we avoid also a circumstance,
which never yet could be, and I am fully confident never can be, admitted in a
free federal republic; I mean a permanent and continued system of tax laws of
the union, executed in the bowels of the states by many thousand officers,
dependent as to the assessing and collecting federal taxes, solely upon the
union. On every principle then, we ought to provide, that the union render an
exact account of all monies raised by imposts and other taxes; and that
whenever monies shall be wanted for the purposes of the union, beyond the
proceeds of the impost duties, requisitions shall be made on the states for the
monies so wanted; and that the power of laying and collecting shall never be
exercised, except in cases where a state shall neglect, a given time, to pay
its quota. This mode seems to be strongly pointed out by the reason of the
case, and spirit of the government; and I believe, there is no instance to be
found in a federal republic, where the congressional powers ever extended
generally to collecting monies by direct taxes or excises. Creating all these
restrictions, still the powers of the union in matters of taxation, will be too
unlimited; further checks, in my mind, are indispensably necessary. Nor do I
conceive, that as full a representation as is practicable in the federal
government, will afford sufficient security: the strength of the government,
and the confidence of the people, must be collected principally in the local
assemblies; every part or branch of the federal head must be feeble, and
unsafely trusted with large powers. A government possessed of more power than
its constituent parts will justify, will not only probably abuse it, but be
unequal to bear its own burden; it may as soon be destroyed by the pressure of
power, as languish and perish for want of it.

There are two ways further of raising checks, and guarding against undue
combinations and influence in a federal system. The first is, in levying taxes,
raising and keeping up armies, in building navies, in forming plans for the
militia, and in appropriating monies for the support of the military, to
require the attendance of a large proportion of the federal representatives, as
two-thirds or three-fourths of them; and in passing laws, in these important
cases, to require the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of the members
present. The second is, by requiring that certain important laws of the federal
head, as a requisition or a law for raising monies by excise shall be laid
before the state legislatures, and if disapproved of by a given number of them,
say by as many of them as represent a majority of the people, the law shall
have no effect. Whether it would be adviseable to adopt both, or either of
these checks, I will not undertake to determine. We have seen them both exist
in confederated republics. The first exists substantially in the confederation,
and will exist in some measure in the plan proposed, as in chusing a president
by the house, in expelling members; in the senate, in making treaties, and in
deciding on impeachments, and in the whole in altering the constitution. The
last exists in the United Netherlands, but in a much greater extent. The first
is founded on this principle, that these important measures may, sometimes, be
adopted by a bare quorum of members, perhaps, from a few states, and that a
bare majority of the federal representatives may frequently be of the
aristocracy, or some particular interests, connections, or parties in the
community, and governed by motives, views, and inclinations not compatible with
the general interest.—The last is founded on this principle, that the
people will be substantially represented, only in their state or local
assemblies; that their principal security must be found in them; and that,
therefore, they ought to have ultimately a constitutional controul over such
interesting measures.

I have often heard it observed, that our people are well informed, and
will not submit to oppressive governments; that the state governments will be
their ready advocates, and possess their confidence, mix with them, and enter
into all their wants and feelings. This is all true; but of what avail will
these circumstances be, if the state governments, thus allowed to be the
guardians of the people, possess no kind of power by the forms of the social
compact, to stop, in their passage, the laws of congress injurious to the
people. State governments must stand and see the law take place; they may
complain and petition—so may individuals; the members of them, in
extreme cases, may resist, on the principles of self-defence—so may the
people and individuals.

It has been observed, that the people, in extensive territories, have
more power, compared with that of their rulers, than in small states. Is not
directly the opposite true? The people in a small state can unite and act in
concert, and with vigour; but in large territories, the men who govern find it
more easy to unite, while people cannot; while they cannot collect the opinions
of each part, while they move to different points, and one part is often played
off against the other.

It has been asserted, that the confederate head of a republic at best,
is in general weak and dependent;—that the people will attach themselves
to, and support their local governments, in all disputes with the union. Admit
the fact: is it any way to remove the inconvenience by accumulating powers upon
a weak organization? The fact is, that the detail administration of affairs, in
this mixed republic, depends principally on the local governments; and the
people would be wretched without them: and a great proportion of social
happiness depends on the internal administration of justice, and on internal
police. The splendor of the monarch, and the power of the government are one
thing. The happiness of the subject depends on very different causes: but it is
to the latter, that the best men, the greatest ornaments of human nature, have
most carefully attended: it is to the former tyrants and oppressors have always
aimed.